Elementary subpaths in discounted stochastic games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Elementary subpaths in discounted stochastic games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1348.91022
author: Kimmo Berg
published in: Dynamic Games and Applications
publication date: 2016-11-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A15
zbMATH DE Number: 6647755
zbMATH Keywords: game theory
zbMATH Keywords: stochastic game
zbMATH Keywords: subgame-perfect equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium path
zbMATH Keywords: fixed-point equation
zbMATH Keywords: tree
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s13235-015-0151-5
OpenAlex ID: W295998915
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DOI: 10.1007/S13235-015-0151-5
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6647755