Strategic collusion in auctions with externalities
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategic collusion in auctions with externalities
zbMATH Open document ID: 1273.91204
author: Omer Biran
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 2013-09-09T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6207037
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
zbMATH Keywords: collusion
zbMATH Keywords: externalities
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: sub-game perfect
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s11238-012-9330-7
OpenAlex ID: W2034293332
cites work: Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
cites work: Bidder collusion
cites work: Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
cites work: Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
cites work: Contracting with externalities and outside options
cites work: Equilibrium binding agreements: a comment
cites work: Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights
cites work: Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
cites work: Equilibrium binding agreements
cites work: A theory of endogenous coalition structures
DOI: 10.1007/S11238-012-9330-7
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6207037