Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game
zbMATH Open document ID: 1273.91215
author: Tibor Neugebauer
author: Sascha Füllbrunn
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 2013-09-18T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2066/112206
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 6208994
zbMATH Keywords: first-price sealed-bid auction
zbMATH Keywords: experiment
zbMATH Keywords: within-subject variation
zbMATH Keywords: between-subject variation
zbMATH Keywords: feedback
describes a project that uses: Z-Tree
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2158010925
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DOI: 10.1007/S11238-013-9378-Z
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6208994