Information concentration in common value environments
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Information concentration in common value environments
zbMATH Open document ID: 1273.91219
author: Vlad Mares
author: Mikhael Shor
published in: Review of Economic Design
publication date: 2013-09-20T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 2012-23.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 6209932
zbMATH Keywords: information concentration
zbMATH Keywords: industry concentration
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: common value auctions
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2164039427
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DOI: 10.1007/S10058-013-0143-0
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6209932