A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
zbMATH Open document ID: 1284.91023
author: Michele Lombardi
author: Naoki Yoshihara
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2013-10-07T00:00:00Z
review text: In this paper the authors deal with the informational efficiency issue pertaining to \textit{E. Maskin}'s theorem [Rev. Econ. Stud. 66, No. 1, 23--38 (1999; Zbl 0956.91034)]. They focus on \(s\)-mechanisms in which each agent reports to the planner solely her own preference and her neighbor's preference, in addition to a feasible social outcome and an integer. It is shown that the class of SCCs (social choice correspondences) that are implementable by \(s\)-mechanisms is fully identified by Condition \(\mu\) of \textit{J. Moore} and \textit{R. Repullo} [Econometrica 58, No. 5, 1083--1099 (1990; Zbl 0731.90009)]. The authors achieve their result in two ways. Firstly, they show their result by directly employing the classical Condition \(\mu\). Next, in the framework developed by Moore and Repullo, they introduce a new condition, Condition \(M^{s}\), which is shown to be equivalent to Condition \(\mu\). The results of the paper are built on the implicit assumption that agents participating in a mechanism are perfectly rational.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 6213702
zbMATH Keywords: Nash implementation
zbMATH Keywords: strategy space reduction
zbMATH Keywords: \(s\)-mechanisms
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2166272227
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-012-0714-2
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6213702