Perfect Nash equilibria in finite repeated game and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the constituent game
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Perfect Nash equilibria in finite repeated game and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the constituent game
zbMATH Open document ID: 1273.91054
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(85)90250-2
author: Michel Moreaux
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2013-10-24T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 6218978
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-1765(85)90250-2
OpenAlex ID: W2038156579
cites work: Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
cites work: Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6218978