Stochastic bankruptcy games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stochastic bankruptcy games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1292.91019
author: Helga Habis
author: P. Jean-Jacques Herings
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2013-11-11T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: MTDP1205.pdf
review text: Uncertain cooperative games with transferable utility are defined as an extension of cooperative games with transferable utility. Correspondingly, the notion of weak sequential core is defined. Stochastic bankruptcy games are cast in this framework and it is proved that several allocation rules from the literature do not belong to the weak sequential core, except the `stochastic constrained equal awards rule', which does under very general conditions.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A15
zbMATH DE Number: 6225326
zbMATH Keywords: stochastic bankruptcy games
zbMATH Keywords: uncertain cooperative games
zbMATH Keywords: transferable utility
zbMATH Keywords: weak sequential core
zbMATH Keywords: stochastic constrained equal awards rule
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2171876839
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DOI: 10.1007/S00182-012-0350-X
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6225326