Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
zbMATH Open document ID: 1358.91063
author: Carmine Ventre
published in: Theoretical Computer Science
publication date: 2014-01-13T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B35
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C90
zbMATH DE Number: 6244495
zbMATH Keywords: algorithmic mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: mechanisms with verification
zbMATH Keywords: algorithms
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.tcs.2013.07.034
OpenAlex ID: W2051359248
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DOI: 10.1016/J.TCS.2013.07.034
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6244495