Application fee manipulations in matching markets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Application fee manipulations in matching markets
zbMATH Open document ID: 1282.91229
author: Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2014-01-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 6246515
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: application fee
zbMATH Keywords: manipulation
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jmateco.2013.08.006
OpenAlex ID: W2031240337
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2013.08.006
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6246515