Agency conflicts in the presence of random private benefits from project implementation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Agency conflicts in the presence of random private benefits from project implementation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1293.91105
author: Ronald A. Dye
author: Sri S. Sridharan
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2014-08-12T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 6329146
zbMATH Keywords: optimal contracting
zbMATH Keywords: moral hazard
zbMATH Keywords: random private benefits
zbMATH Keywords: depressed incentives
zbMATH Keywords: increasing residual values
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2014.02.025
OpenAlex ID: W1966445636
cites work: An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
cites work: Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.02.025
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6329146