Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?
zbMATH Open document ID: 1302.91078
author: S. Courtin
author: Boniface Mbih
author: Issofa Moyouwou
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2014-09-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6339907
Wikidata QID: Q114018207
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-013-0758-7
OpenAlex ID: W2064171732
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-013-0758-7
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6339907