Plea bargaining: on the selection of jury trials
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Plea bargaining: on the selection of jury trials
zbMATH Open document ID: 1296.91103
author: Sangmok Lee
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2014-09-05T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6340790
zbMATH Keywords: plea bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: strategic voting
zbMATH Keywords: collective choice
zbMATH Keywords: jury trial
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-014-0801-7
OpenAlex ID: W1966294249
cites work: Social choice and strategic decisions. Essay in honor of Jeffrey S. Banks.
cites work: Signaling bargaining power: Strategic delay versus restricted offers
cites work: Signaling via an agenda in multi-issue bargaining with incomplete information
cites work: Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
cites work: Deliberative voting
cites work: Alternating-offer bargaining over menus under incomplete information
DOI: 10.1007/S00199-014-0801-7
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6340790