Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
zbMATH Open document ID: 1309.91073
author: Ron Siegel
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2014-09-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6341175
zbMATH Keywords: contests
zbMATH Keywords: all-pay
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetries
zbMATH Keywords: interdependent valuations
zbMATH Keywords: correlated signals
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2014.03.003
OpenAlex ID: W1979914920
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2014.03.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6341175