The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections
zbMATH Open document ID: 1277.91153
author: Matias Iaryczower
author: Andrea Mattozzi
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2012-05-03T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79460/
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 6029808
zbMATH Keywords: campaign spending
zbMATH Keywords: elections
zbMATH Keywords: campaign limits
zbMATH Keywords: political parties
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2166606731
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-011-0613-Y
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6029808