Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core
zbMATH Open document ID: 1258.91090
author: Akira Okada
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2012-05-14T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 6034547
zbMATH Keywords: core
zbMATH Keywords: exchange economy
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete information
zbMATH Keywords: information transmission
zbMATH Keywords: non-cooperative bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: signaling
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2012.01.009
OpenAlex ID: W1576764111
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2012.01.009
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6034547