Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment
zbMATH Open document ID: 1279.91079
author: Brendan Daley
author: Konstantin Sonin
author: Michael Schwarz
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2012-05-14T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 6034654
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
zbMATH Keywords: efficient mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: signaling
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2011.11.006
OpenAlex ID: W2084451112
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2011.11.006
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6034654