A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura)
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura)
zbMATH Open document ID: 1274.91045
author: Carles Rafels
author: Josep M. Izquierdo
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2012-05-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6035635
zbMATH Keywords: convex games
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining set
zbMATH Keywords: core
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00182-011-0291-9
OpenAlex ID: W2030361769
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DOI: 10.1007/S00182-011-0291-9
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6035635