Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems
zbMATH Open document ID: 1239.91018
author: Bary S. R. Pradelski
author: H. Peyton Young
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2012-06-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 6042497
zbMATH Keywords: stochastic stability
zbMATH Keywords: completely uncoupled learning
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium selection
zbMATH Keywords: distributed control
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2032200533
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2012.02.017
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6042497