On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
zbMATH Open document ID: 1239.91110
author: Scott Duke Kominers
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2012-06-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 6042503
zbMATH Keywords: many-to-many matching
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: substitutes
zbMATH Keywords: contract design
zbMATH Keywords: unitarity
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2011.12.002
OpenAlex ID: W2154721040
cites work: The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
cites work: Q3066116
cites work: Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
cites work: Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
cites work: Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
cites work: Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
cites work: Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2011.12.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6042503