Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms
zbMATH Open document ID: 1239.91071
published in: Review of Economic Design
publication date: 2012-06-13T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
zbMATH DE Number: 6046268
zbMATH Keywords: Lindahl allocation
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: experimental economics
author: Matt Van Essen
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10058-011-0112-4
OpenAlex ID: W2089326555
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DOI: 10.1007/S10058-011-0112-4
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6046268