Implementation with partial provability
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Implementation with partial provability
zbMATH Open document ID: 1247.91054
author: Elchanan Ben-Porath
author: Barton L. Lipman
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2012-09-12T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6081458
zbMATH Keywords: implementation
zbMATH Keywords: hard evidence
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2012.01.017
OpenAlex ID: W2134750299
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2012.01.017
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6081458