Job market signaling and employer learning
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Job market signaling and employer learning
zbMATH Open document ID: 1247.91027
author: Carlos Alós-Ferrer
author: Julien Prat
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2012-09-12T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 6081461
zbMATH Keywords: employer learning
zbMATH Keywords: signaling games
zbMATH Keywords: intuitive criterion
zbMATH Keywords: multiple pooling
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2012.01.018
OpenAlex ID: W3023814074
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2012.01.018
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6081461