Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: an inversion result
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: an inversion result
zbMATH Open document ID: 1247.91078
author: Stephan Lauermann
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2012-09-12T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 6081467
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic matching and bargaining games
zbMATH Keywords: decentralized markets
zbMATH Keywords: consumer privacy
zbMATH Keywords: search frictions
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric information
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2012.05.021
OpenAlex ID: W3123357650
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2012.05.021
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6081467