Futures market: contractual arrangement to restrain moral hazard in teams
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Futures market: contractual arrangement to restrain moral hazard in teams
zbMATH Open document ID: 1247.91097
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2012-09-18T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: dp633.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C31
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
zbMATH DE Number: 6083833
zbMATH Keywords: team
zbMATH Keywords: contract theory
zbMATH Keywords: futures market
zbMATH Keywords: duality of linear programming
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2238579971
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-010-0600-8
author: Joon Song
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6083833