Allocation rules for games with optimistic aspirations
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Allocation rules for games with optimistic aspirations
zbMATH Open document ID: 1305.91026
DOI: 10.1155/2013/540487
author: Luisa Carpente
author: Anne van den Nouweland
author: Balbina Casas-Méndez
author: Ignacio García-Jurado
published in: Game Theory
publication date: 2014-09-30T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: A game with optimistic aspirations specifies two values for each coalition of players: the first value is the worth that the players in the coalition can guarantee for themselves in the event that they coordinate their actions, and the second value is the amount that the players in the coalition aspire to get under reasonable but very optimistic assumptions about the demands of the players who are not included in the coalition. In this paper, in addition to presenting this model and justifying its relevance, we introduce allocation rules and extend the properties of efficiency, additivity, symmetry, and null player property to this setting. We demonstrate that these four properties are insufficient to find a unique allocation rule and define three properties involving null players and nullifying players that allow the identification of unique allocation rules. The allocation rules we identify are the Midpoint Shapley Value and the Equal Division Rule.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 6349557
Wikidata QID: Q58919854
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/540487
OpenAlex ID: W3123920445
cites work: Q5817870
cites work: Q5844986
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6349557