Nash equilibria in large games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Nash equilibria in large games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1305.91033
DOI: 10.1155/2014/617596
author: Dionysius Glycopantis
published in: Game Theory
publication date: 2014-09-30T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: This paper adds to the discussion, in a general setting, that given a Nash-Schmeidler (nonanonymous) game it is not always possible to define a Mas-Colell (anonymous) game. In the two games, the players have different strategic behaviours and the formulations of the two problems are different. Also, we offer a novel explanation for the lack of a Nash equilibrium in an infinite game. We consider this game as the limit of a sequence of approximate, finite games for which an equilibrium exists. However, the limiting pure strategy function is not measurable.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A07
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 6349562
Wikidata QID: Q59050315
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/617596
OpenAlex ID: W1976368316
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6349562