A limit theorem for equilibria under ambiguous belief correspondences
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A limit theorem for equilibria under ambiguous belief correspondences
zbMATH Open document ID: 1296.91010
author: Giuseppe De Marco
author: Maria Romaniello
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2014-10-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 6352877
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.mathsocsci.2013.10.001
OpenAlex ID: W2093882041
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DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2013.10.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6352877