Candidates, Credibility, and Re-election Incentives
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Candidates, Credibility, and Re-election Incentives
zbMATH Open document ID: 1405.91161
author: Richard Van Weelden
publication date: 2019-01-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
zbMATH DE Number: 7005340
zbMATH Keywords: political competition
zbMATH Keywords: repeated elections
zbMATH Keywords: endogenous candidates
zbMATH Keywords: divergent platforms
zbMATH Keywords: rent-seeking
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: rdt014
OpenAlex ID: W3124515355
DOI: 10.1093/RESTUD/RDT014
published in: Review of Economic Studies
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7005340