Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1
zbMATH Open document ID: 1405.91222
author: Vincent Anesi
author: Daniel J. Seidmann
publication date: 2019-01-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
zbMATH DE Number: 7005417
zbMATH Keywords: legislative bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: endogenous default
zbMATH Keywords: pork barrel
zbMATH Keywords: policy persistence
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: rdv009
OpenAlex ID: W2156790980
DOI: 10.1093/RESTUD/RDV009
published in: Review of Economic Studies
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7005417