C-complete sets for compromise stable games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: C-complete sets for compromise stable games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1304.91026
author: Trine Tornøe Platz
author: Herbert Hamers
author: Marieke Quant
published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
publication date: 2014-11-13T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: dpbe25 2012.pdf
review text: The paper investigates the relationship between compromise stability of transferable utility games and efficient payoff vectors; specifically, the main results study the structure of the generators of the core cover, and conditions ensuring that the game is compromise stable.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 6369330
zbMATH Keywords: core
zbMATH Keywords: core cover
zbMATH Keywords: larginal vectors
zbMATH Keywords: TU-game
reviewed by: George Stoica
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2109234772
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DOI: 10.1007/S00186-014-0477-6
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6369330