Community enforcement with observation costs
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Community enforcement with observation costs
zbMATH Open document ID: 1309.91015
author: Yu Awaya
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2014-11-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A07
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 6370827
zbMATH Keywords: repeated game
zbMATH Keywords: random matching
zbMATH Keywords: community enforcement
zbMATH Keywords: observation cost
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2014.09.007
OpenAlex ID: W2016190513
cites work: The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
cites work: Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
cites work: Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
cites work: Repeated games with voluntary information purchase
cites work: The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
cites work: Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
cites work: Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2014.09.007
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6370827