Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations
zbMATH Open document ID: 1301.91038
author: Hans-Peter Weikard
author: Rob Dellink
published in: Annals of Operations Research
publication date: 2014-11-26T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B76
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B74
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
zbMATH DE Number: 6374160
zbMATH Keywords: stability of coalitions
zbMATH Keywords: international environmental agreements
zbMATH Keywords: partition function approach
zbMATH Keywords: sharing rules
zbMATH Keywords: renegotiations
zbMATH Keywords: climate agreements
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10479-010-0795-x
OpenAlex ID: W2140023646
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cites work: Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
cites work: Stable international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant, uncertainty and learning
DOI: 10.1007/S10479-010-0795-X
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6374160