Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
zbMATH Open document ID: 1303.91123
author: John William Hatfield
author: Fuhito Kojima
author: Yusuke Narita
published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics
publication date: 2014-12-03T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6376324
zbMATH Keywords: many-to-many two-sided matching
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: monotonicity
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: max-min preferences
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.dam.2014.07.003
OpenAlex ID: W3125146094
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cites work: Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
DOI: 10.1016/J.DAM.2014.07.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6376324