Legal enforcement, default and heterogeneity of project-financing contracts
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Legal enforcement, default and heterogeneity of project-financing contracts
zbMATH Open document ID: 1319.91153
author: Gabriel A. Madeira
published in: Annals of Finance
publication date: 2014-12-12T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: GabrielMadeira 31WP.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91G40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B69
zbMATH DE Number: 6380105
zbMATH Keywords: credit constraints
zbMATH Keywords: legal enforcement
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: investment
zbMATH Keywords: interest rates
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2026783695
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DOI: 10.1007/S10436-014-0256-7
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6380105