Runs, panics and bubbles: Diamond-Dybvig and Morris-Shin reconsidered
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Runs, panics and bubbles: Diamond-Dybvig and Morris-Shin reconsidered
zbMATH Open document ID: 1335.91020
author: Yong-Cai Geng
author: Sumit K. Garg
published in: Annals of Finance
publication date: 2014-12-12T00:00:00Z
review text: The authors suggest a development of noncooperative game models in a financial market as proposed in [\textit{D. W. Diamond} and \textit{P. H. Dybvig}, J. Polit. Econ. 91, No. 3, 401--419 (1983; Zbl 1341.91135)] and [\textit{S. Morris} and \textit{H. S. Shin}, ``Unique equilibrium in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks'', Am. Econ. Rev. 88, 587--597 (1998), \url{http://www.jstor.org/stable/116850}]. They analyze a simplified model at three levels: in the original Nash equilibrium with implicit expectations, in a correlated subgame perfect equilibrium of the corresponding extensive form, and use a replicatior dynamic to identify subgame fixed points and their stability.
reviewed by: Igor V. Konnov
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91G99
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B64
zbMATH DE Number: 6380106
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary games
zbMATH Keywords: noncooperative games
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic investment model
zbMATH Keywords: replicator dynamics
zbMATH Keywords: sensitivity analysis
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10436-013-0231-8
OpenAlex ID: W1964472176
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DOI: 10.1007/S10436-013-0231-8
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6380106