Truth-telling and trust in sender-receiver games with intervention: an experimental study
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Truth-telling and trust in sender-receiver games with intervention: an experimental study
zbMATH Open document ID: 1302.91053
author: Ismail Saglam
author: Mehmet Yiğit Gürdal
author: Ayça Özdoğan
published in: Review of Economic Design
publication date: 2014-12-17T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 6381189
zbMATH Keywords: strategic information transmission
zbMATH Keywords: truth-telling
zbMATH Keywords: trust
zbMATH Keywords: sender-receiver game
zbMATH Keywords: intervention
describes a project that uses: Z-Tree
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10058-013-0155-9
OpenAlex ID: W2074269645
cites work: Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
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cites work: An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game
cites work: Enjoy the silence: An experiment on truth-telling
DOI: 10.1007/S10058-013-0155-9
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6381189