Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts
zbMATH Open document ID: 1307.91091
author: Ella Segev
author: Aner Sela
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2015-01-09T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6385137
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-014-0816-9
OpenAlex ID: W2011233852
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-014-0816-9
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6385137