Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence
zbMATH Open document ID: 1307.91069
author: Ceyhun Coban
author: M. Remzi Sanver
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2015-01-09T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6385139
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-014-0812-0
OpenAlex ID: W2165525781
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-014-0812-0
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6385139