Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements
zbMATH Open document ID: 1302.91131
author: Luís Vasconcelos
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2015-01-14T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: Contract Signal Investment Final.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 6386065
zbMATH Keywords: relationship-specific investment
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric information
zbMATH Keywords: exclusivity
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3125612039
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2014.04.006
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6386065