A foundation for strategic agenda voting
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A foundation for strategic agenda voting
zbMATH Open document ID: 1302.91071
author: Jose Apesteguia
author: Yusufcan Masatlioglu
author: Miguel A. Ballester
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2015-01-14T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/19910
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
zbMATH DE Number: 6386069
zbMATH Keywords: strategic voting
zbMATH Keywords: agendas
zbMATH Keywords: committees
zbMATH Keywords: institutions
zbMATH Keywords: axioms
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2033504908
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2014.05.006
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6386069