Learning with bounded memory in games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Learning with bounded memory in games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1302.91032
author: Daniel Monte
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2015-01-14T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 6386075
zbMATH Keywords: bounded memory
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete information games
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2014.03.005
OpenAlex ID: W1994151153
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2014.03.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6386075