Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures
zbMATH Open document ID: 1302.91036
author: Carlos Alós-Ferrer
author: Simon Weidenholzer
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2015-01-14T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A43
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 6386087
zbMATH Keywords: minimum effort games
zbMATH Keywords: local interactions
zbMATH Keywords: learning
zbMATH Keywords: imitation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2014.05.013
OpenAlex ID: W2078308292
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2014.05.013
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6386087