The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations
zbMATH Open document ID: 1302.91158
author: Lucas Maestri
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2015-01-14T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B69
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 6386088
zbMATH Keywords: principal-agent model
zbMATH Keywords: subjective evaluations
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2014.05.015
OpenAlex ID: W2035817426
cites work: Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2014.05.015
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6386088