From Custer to Thermopylae: last stand behavior in multi-stage contests
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: From Custer to Thermopylae: last stand behavior in multi-stage contests
zbMATH Open document ID: 1302.91105
author: Alan Gelder
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2015-01-14T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 6386090
zbMATH Keywords: last stand
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic contest
zbMATH Keywords: race
zbMATH Keywords: all-pay auction
zbMATH Keywords: winning momentum
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2014.06.003
OpenAlex ID: W2149475653
cites work: The all-pay auction with complete information
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2014.06.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6386090