A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
zbMATH Open document ID: 1302.91070
author: Tsuyoshi Adachi
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2015-01-14T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
zbMATH DE Number: 6386094
zbMATH Keywords: implementation theory
zbMATH Keywords: backward induction
zbMATH Keywords: subgame perfect equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2014.07.003
OpenAlex ID: W2031862064
cites work: Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2014.07.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6386094