Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
zbMATH Open document ID: 1302.91104
author: Daniel F. Garrett
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2015-01-14T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 6386103
zbMATH Keywords: cost-based procurement
zbMATH Keywords: simple mechanisms
zbMATH Keywords: minimax
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2013.06.004
OpenAlex ID: W2037006877
cites work: Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
cites work: Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
cites work: On the robustness of Laissez-Faire
cites work: Adverse selection under ignorance
cites work: Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
cites work: Monotone Comparative Statics
cites work: Nonparametric Identification of a Contract Model With Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
cites work: Q4002751
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2013.06.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6386103