On learning dynamics underlying the evolution of learning rules
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On learning dynamics underlying the evolution of learning rules
zbMATH Open document ID: 1303.92079
author: Slimane Dridi
author: Laurent Lehmann
published in: Theoretical Population Biology
publication date: 2015-01-20T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: REF.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 92D15
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 60J20
zbMATH DE Number: 6388082
zbMATH Keywords: fluctuating environments
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary game theory
zbMATH Keywords: stochastic approximation
zbMATH Keywords: reinforcement learning
zbMATH Keywords: fictitious play
zbMATH Keywords: producer-scrounger game
Wikidata QID: Q46877684
describes a project that uses: Mathematica
describes a project that uses: R
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2067312754
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DOI: 10.1016/J.TPB.2013.09.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6388082