Multi-task agency with unawareness
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Multi-task agency with unawareness
zbMATH Open document ID: 1304.91148
author: Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden
author: Xiaojian Zhao
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 2015-01-21T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B69
zbMATH DE Number: 6388995
zbMATH Keywords: multi-task agency
zbMATH Keywords: unawareness
zbMATH Keywords: moral hazard
zbMATH Keywords: screening
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete contracts
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s11238-013-9397-9
OpenAlex ID: W3125454880
cites work: Incomplete contracts and complexity costs
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cites work: Incentives for Unaware Agents
DOI: 10.1007/S11238-013-9397-9
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6388995