Group stability in matching with interdependent values
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Group stability in matching with interdependent values
zbMATH Open document ID: 1329.91101
author: Archishman Chakraborty
author: Alessandro Citanna
author: Michael Ostrovsky
published in: Review of Economic Design
publication date: 2015-08-21T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 6474906
zbMATH Keywords: interdependent values
zbMATH Keywords: group stability
zbMATH Keywords: modified serial dictatorship
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10058-014-0156-3
OpenAlex ID: W2120438552
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DOI: 10.1007/S10058-014-0156-3
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6474906