Cournot vs. Bertrand under relative performance delegation: implications of positive and negative network externalities
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Cournot vs. Bertrand under relative performance delegation: implications of positive and negative network externalities
zbMATH Open document ID: 1331.91118
author: Rupayan Pal
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2015-08-24T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B54
zbMATH DE Number: 6475193
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.mathsocsci.2015.02.007
OpenAlex ID: W1981392680
cites work: Comparing Cournot and Bertrand in a homogeneous product market
cites work: A note on price and quantity competition in differentiated oligopolies
cites work: Strategic delegation under price competition and network effects
DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2015.02.007
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6475193